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Abstract 
Over more than thirty years of commercial and fine art photographic practice, I have often noticed 
remarkable disparities between the scenes, objects, events or moments ‘out there’ I had attempted 
to record – and the images within the resulting photographs. These (sometimes subtle, sometimes 
profound, but rarely anticipatable) disparities between what I had seen and what the photograph 
shows me offer the tantalising suggestion that there may be something else going on here – but 
something which the popular conception of photography may hinder our ability to recognise.  
 
This article explores the implications of four central assumptions implicit within the popular 
conception of photography which may impede new ways of thinking about photographic practice. 
Supported by a number of photographs that depict scenes, events and ‘moments’ which were not 
‘taken’ but were created by the act of photographing them, I will suggest that new opportunities 
for practice may be available by ‘re-imagining’ the practice of photography as an active – or, as 
an act of – collaboration between medium and practitioner.  
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1 
Introduction 
 
Nobody can commit photography alone. Marshall McLuhan (1964: 183) 
 
Many photographs confront us with significant disparities between the scenes, objects or events 
‘out there’ at which we pointed the camera – and the images within the resulting photographs. 
These disparities offer the tantalising suggestion that there may be something else going on here – 
but which the popular conception of photography may hinder our ability to recognise.  
 
This article explores four of the central assumptions implicit within the popular conception of 
photography (including what it ‘is’ and what it ‘does’) as a first step towards devising new ways 
of thinking about, and using, the medium. Supported by several photographs that document 
scenes, events and moments which were not out there to be ‘taken’ but which were created by the 
act of photographing them, I will argue that new opportunities for practice may be available by 
‘re-imagining’ the practice of photography as an active – or, as an act of – collaboration between 
medium and practitioner.  
 
As a legacy of its origins in the industrial revolution, one of the most widely accepted and 
influential assumptions is that that the camera is a “mechanical device” (Kogan 2015: 869): one 
which – like the microscope and the telescope – provides an “accurate and objective record” 
(Genoni 2002: 137) and “a truthful account” (Fosdick and Fahmy, 2007: 1) of what was ‘out 
there’. Assumed to share “the same level of reality” as the things they depict (Flusser 2000: 15), 
Snyder and Allen (1975: 145) summarise “the modern position” that photographs show us things 
“as they really are” (Ross 1982: 12). 
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This ‘modern position’ assumes that photographs are the product of (the interaction of) three 
factors (Rogers 1978; Smith 1999; Rutherford 2014):  
i. The appearance and/or behaviour of the thing/s in front of the lens  
ii. The photographer’s intention: what we want to show you  
iii. The photographer’s expertise in using the camera (and its attendant tools and techniques) in 
pursuit of our intended result  
 
The first reflects the belief that photographs are an accurate record of ‘something out there’ (that 
which the photograph denotes) which ‘really did look like that’ at the moment and from the 
perspective at which it was photographed. This confidence in the objective accuracy with which 
the medium depicts the thing/s in front of the lens is both reflected in and reinforced by the 
popular description of photographs as ‘taken’. 
 
The second reflects the belief that the camera is a passive tool under the control of the 
photographer/operator whose decisions in the pursuit of an intended result (that which the 
photograph is intended to connote) determined both the content and the appearance of the image – 
and (assuming the competence of the photographer) its corollary that his/her intention can be 
reliably inferred from the result of these decisions. 
 
The third reflects the belief that the clarity and affective power with which the intended 
connotation has been ‘captured’ depends on the expertise with which the photographer made and 
carried out these decisions.  
 
While the merit of many photographs is indeed the result of these three factors, I will argue that 
some photographs are the result of a fourth factor – but one which the popular conception of 
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photography often obscures from view. I will call this fourth factor ‘the active collaboration by 
the medium’. 
 
While the decisions as to what to photograph, as well as how to photograph it are subjective (and 
are the basis of our judgement that one photographer’s work is superior to another’s), the result is 
nevertheless acknowledged to be objective ‘photographic evidence’ that the scene, object or event 
had really “been there” (Barthes 1984: 76) and really had looked like that at that moment and 
from that perspective. Bazin (1960) argued that it is this ability to record and show us something 
that was ‘really there’ which confers on photographs their unique power and credibility. 
 
[Figure 1] 
 
[Figure 2] 
 
Figure 1 is the last known image of the Titanic as she set sail from Queenstown, Ireland en route 
to New York. Figure 2 shows 12 year old Anne Frank, leaning over the balcony of her apartment.  
 
Looking at these images, we share a moment – with both the photographers and those they 
photographed – in which all is well, while, at the same time, we are conscious of knowing 
something they do not: the tragedy that was about to unfold. This unique ability of photographs 
(to offer what Bryman [2012: 427] called “a window on reality” and which Arnheim [1974: 155] 
described as one of its “positive virtues”) derives precisely from their mechanical origins. Their 
ability to affect us is a result, not just of the scenes and events they depict – but because they are 
photographs of these scenes and events. In this way, the contribution of the medium is as 
significant a factor in the final result as the thing/s in front of the lens, and certainly more 
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significant than either the photographer’s intention or his/her expertise. 
 
Palmer (2017) has argued that the practice of photography is inherently dialogical and has always 
depended on – and benefitted from – the act of collaboration (including “artistic coauthorship 
[between] photographers and their subjects, and [between] photographs and viewers”). However, 
even when the camera is acknowledged to have played a role in creating the scene, event or 
‘moment’ recorded, consistent with the conception of the camera as a passive tool under the 
control of the photographer, this influence is understood to be limited to the effect of its presence 
(and the implied suggestion that a photograph may be taken) on the behaviours of the individuals 
who may be recorded (Burgess et al. 2000; Azoulay 2010).  
 
What is rarely acknowledged however is the role of the medium in creating scenes, events and 
‘moments’ which did not exist until they were photographed. One of the very few writers on 
photography to discuss this, Solomon-Godeau argues that considering and exploring the 
implications of photography’s ability to create the event that the photograph records offers the 
prospect of “a profound alteration in our perception of what a photograph is” (1981: 26-27). 
 
This article will explore four central assumptions implicit in the popular understanding of 
photography (what it ‘is’ and what it ‘does’) that appear to hinder our ability to recognise that, in 
some photographs, the scene, event or ‘moment’ was not ‘there’ to be ‘taken’, but was instead 
made by the act of photographing it: 
 
1. The manner in which language frames and circumscribes photographic discourse, 
2. The ontological and epistemological assumptions implicit within the design and application 
of the visual research methods used to discuss and interrogate photographs,  
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3. Our experience of, and our assumptions about, the nature of space and time, and 
4. Our assumptions about the kinds of things which are ‘the subject’ of photographs. 
 
The influence of the conceptual obstacles posed by these assumptions will be briefly explored and, 
with thanks to the photographers who kindly granted permission to include examples of their 
work, a selection of photographs will suggest ways in which we might overcome these obstacles 
to devise new approaches to practice. 
 
The influence of the discourse: the language used to discuss photographs 
In a similar way to that in which the camera delineates what is enclosed – and what is excluded – 
by the frame of the photograph, the language we use to discuss photographs defines (from Latin 
definire: ‘to circumscribe’) our conceptions of what is happening and who or what is making it 
happen.  
 
According to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, the thought processes encoded within and promulgated 
by the structure of language have a profound, but often unnoticed, influence on our perceptions, 
experiences and understandings. Lakoff and Johnson (2008) argue that our conceptual systems are 
inherently metaphoric in nature and that, by informing the structure of the metaphors through 
which we make sense of the world, our language defines (circumscribes) what we attend to. 
Through diction, idiom, grammar and syntax, our language determines what things and 
relationships we have the means to describe – and therefore conceive of (and, as Orwell [1962] 
warned, will even do our thinking for us); through the subject-object relations of its sentence 
structure, our language determines who-is-doing-what. Together, these features of our language 
dictate both what we notice as well as the meaning we ‘find’ in it (Korzybski 1933; Hayakawa 
1949; Whorf 1952). It follows therefore that concepts and relationships our language does not 
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recognise (those things and actions for which we do not have words) are thereby rendered both 
invisible and ‘inconceivable’. 
 
[Thinking] follows a network of tracks laid down in the given language, an organization which may 
concentrate systematically upon certain phases of reality […] and systematically discard others. The 
individual is utterly unaware of this organization and is constrained completely within its 
unbreakable bonds. (Whorf 1952: 177) 
 
Bordieu (1993: 158) argued that, because our knowledge of the conditions under which work was 
both conceived and produced takes place after the fact in the domain of rational thought (and is 
therefore shaped by the syntactic structure of our language), our conception of the finished 
product (what Bordieu called the “opus operatum”) conceals the process (“the modus operandi”) 
by which it was created. Although Bordieu was referring to the conception and production of 
social theories, Sekula (1982: 84) argues that the same “limiting function” applies to photographic 
discourse by restricting or excluding certain notions from consideration.  
 
In addition to its capacity to label – and thereby both circumscribe and delineate – our conception 
of the nature of things, Korzybski (1933) argued that our understanding of the relations between 
things resulting from the subject-object categories of grammar and syntax informs our 
conceptions of both what is happening and the identity of who or what is making it happen. 
Accordingly, even if we adopt the habit of describing (and so encouraging ourselves to think of) 
photographs as ‘made’ rather than ‘taken’, we will still not escape the influence of the biases 
inherent in subject-object relations which lead us to assume that it is the photographer/actor who 
does the ‘taking’ or ‘making’. 
 
Sekula (1982: 84) argued that “the logic of the discourse” is a product of the frames imposed by 
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the diction, grammar and syntax used in discussing photographs – and these, in turn, lead to a 
“bounded arena of shared expectations” which limit the ‘kinds’ of meanings and interpretations 
that are possible. 
 
In a very important sense, the notion of discourse is a notion of limits. That is, the overall discourse 
relation could be regarded as a limiting function, one that establishes a bounded arena of shared 
expectations as to meaning. It is this limiting function that determines the very possibility of meaning. 
(Sekula 1982: 84) 
 
Deleuze makes the same point, but goes further and argues that the influence of language even 
“transforms” the material we are investigating. 
 
We mean that, when language gets hold of this material (and it necessarily does so), then it gives 
rise to utterances which come to dominate or even replace the images and signs, and which refer in 
turn to pertinent features of the language system, syntagms and paradigms, completely different 
from those we started with. [T]he language system only exists in its reaction to a non-language 
material that it transforms. (Deleuze 1989: 29) 
 
The most subtle – and as a result, perhaps the most powerful – way in which the language we use 
shapes the way we think of photographs is in the near-ubiquitous habit of saying that photographs 
are ‘taken’. By describing (and thinking of) photographs as having been taken (past participle of 
‘take’: to remove someone or something, Oxford 2005), we implicitly reinforce three assumptions 
which, together, are central to the popular conception of both how photographs are produced (by 
‘removing something’) as well as what they show us (‘the thing removed’):  
 
i. That the scene, event or moment depicted in the photograph already existed ‘out there’ in 
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the world to be ‘taken’ (or “purloined, confiscated, appropriated, stolen” [Crimp 1980: 98]) 
independent of the act of recording it. In describing the popular conception of photographs, 
I referred to this as the appearance and/or behaviour of the thing/s in front of the lens. 
 
ii. That, implied in the subject-object relations (which determines who was the actor and who 
or what was acted upon) is the assumption that it was ‘taken’ by the photographer (that it 
was s/he who ‘took it’). I referred to this as the photographer’s intention. 
 
iii. That the camera functioned as a kind of portable photocopier under the (more or less) 
conscious control of the actor/photographer, providing both an objective record of the 
existence of ‘that which was taken’ as well as reliable evidence that ‘it looked like that’. I 
referred to this as our expertise in using the technology in pursuit of our intended result. 
 
An essential first step therefore in conceiving of new ways to practice is to challenge the 
assumptions implied within (and reinforced by) the way we describe and discuss photographs. I 
am not being entirely flippant by suggesting that we might begin to change the way we think 
about photographs (what they ‘are’, how they are produced and what they can show us) if we 
were to say (and think) that photographs ‘make themselves’ – or if, when coming home with new 
pictures in our camera, we were to say (and think) that: ‘It certainly was photographing a lot 
outside today…’. 
 
By describing photographs as ‘made’ not ‘taken’, I am not referring (as Artner does), to the 
photographer’s ability to apply intention (by knowing “what to look and wait for, as well as how 
to shoot it” Artner 2003) or, (as Ansel Adams did) to the importance of expertise in crafting the 
image in pursuit of an intended result. Instead, I am suggesting that, by describing (and by 
Is this photograph taken? 
9 
thinking of) photographs as having been ‘made’ by the act of photographing them, we encourage 
ourselves to consciously and explicitly acknowledge the contribution of the medium in 
documenting “a time that has never been […] part of any present” (Wall 2004).  
 
[Figure 3] 
 
[Figure 4] 
 
By adopting a new vocabulary to describe photographs, we can start to ‘re-frame’ our 
understanding of what photographs ‘are’ and how they are produced to include the possibility that 
they are sometimes able to show us scenes, events or ‘moments’ which either did not exist ‘out 
there’ in the world – and so were not ‘there’ to be ‘taken’ (Figure 3), or which could not have 
been witnessed – and so could not have been intended by the photographer (Figure 4).  
 
The assumptions within visual research methodologies 
A central role of theory is to identify (uncover) and explore the possibilities inherent within 
practice through which, “the unexpected and transforming possibilities within practice can be 
brought to light” (Davey 2006: 21). However, the precepts hidden within “the logic of the 
discourse” and the resulting “bounded arena of shared expectations” (Sekula 1982: 84), our 
theories can also close off other possible investigations. By recognising the ontological and 
epistemological ‘frames’ that inform our theories and by examining the assumptions they both 
reflect and reinforce, Davey suggests that the resulting insights may serve as a midwife to new 
practices Davey (2006: 21).  
 
By informing our assumptions for both what photographs ‘are’ (automated representations of 
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reality) and what they show us (things as they really are), the popular conception of photographs 
shapes the design, the application and the objectives of the visual research methodologies used to 
interrogate them. One of the significant ways in which the discourse ‘bounds’ or circumscribes 
our shared expectations is in the assumption that the value of photographs resides in what they 
connote to people about people by documenting the social meaning of actions and appearances. 
According to Barthes (1984), a photograph cannot be distinguished from its referent – and that 
this referent is always a social or human truth.  
 
This conception of photographs – what they ‘are’ and what they are ‘for’ – defines them as both 
an accurate record of and the product of the social practices (what Cobley and Haeffner termed 
“the politics of representation” 2009: 133) which informed, and from which we can therefore infer, 
why the photograph was ‘taken’, how it was taken, of what it was taken (its ‘subject’), when, and 
by whom.  
 
Every photographic image is a sign, above all, of someone’s investment in the sending of a 
message. (Sekula 1982: 5-6). 
 
In her widely-cited text (6268 citations as of April 2018) on visual research methodologies, Rose 
explicitly endorses this conception of what photographs ‘are’ (and, by extension, the purpose of 
investigating them) as “valuable as records of what was really there when the shutter snapped 
[and therefore] sources of evidence in social science research” (Rose 2012: 299). As she 
acknowledges, this reflects the assumption that “[i]t is the objects made visible in images that […] 
researchers are interested in” and that the “significance of the photos is seen to rest on what is 
pictured, not how it is pictured” (Rose 2012: 30-31).  
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These anthropocentric biases within the ontological and epistemological priorities of visual 
research methodologies (what Benjamin [2006: 117] called their “historical circumstances” and 
what Sekula [1982: 84] termed “the logic of the discourse” which has resulted in a “bounded 
arena of shared expectations”) define for us both the purpose of investigating photographs as well 
as how we should do so. As a result, we are led to look, not at photographs, but through them – as 
if through a portal or magical window – and this, in turn, informs what we are liable to see in 
them.  
 
By limiting our definition of the referent (what it is we should look at – and for) to social or 
human truths (which Batchen [1999: 5] described as “the dominant way of thinking about the 
medium”), visual research methodologies close off other possible conceptions of what the 
photograph may show us or ‘what was really there’, hindering our ability to investigate (or even 
to conceive of) what other kinds of subjects for our attention photographs might also record. By 
attending to – and by reflecting on the implications of – the differences between the appearance of 
the scenes, objects, events or moments out there we had attempted to record – and how the 
photograph depicted it, we might find that the photograph is ‘about’ something other than what 
we intended – and something which is the result of the contribution of the medium. 
 
In an effort to peek beneath what Van Leeuwen and Jewitt (2001: 2) recognise as the 
“superimposed […] layer of connotative or symbolic meaning”, I will briefly consider how our 
anthropocentric perceptual and cognitive biases (McQuire 1997) about the nature of space and 
time shape also ‘bound’ the shared expectations about the events depicted in photographs.  
 
The influence of ‘bino-chrono consciousness’ 
Our assumptions about the nature of space (which allows us to perceive depth) and time (which 
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allows us to perceive movement) are the product of our internalised mental model of the 
Newtonian universe – and we regard both as authentic and independent properties of the world in 
which we live. We may experience ‘time passing quickly when we are having fun’, but we 
‘know’ that both the speed at which time passes and the direction in which it travels are constant 
and so adjust our interpretation of our sense perceptions accordingly.  
 
This contrast between subjective experience and (what we believe to be) objective reality is why 
we enjoy stage magic: because it confronts us with an amusing intellectual dichotomy between 
what our eyes tell us has just happened – and what we know simply cannot have happened. But, 
as anyone who has shown a magic trick to a young child will know, they are not impressed 
because they have not yet internalised our (western) convictions about what is – and what is not – 
real or possible. 
 
There are two main concerns here: 
 
i. Our conception of space resulting from our binocular vision (which not only gives us the 
means to experience three-dimensions – depth and distance – but provides “an ontological 
standard of objective perception” [Cat 2013: 115] as a result of which we assume that three 
dimensions are an objective, tangible property of external reality), and  
 
ii. Our conception of time resulting from our experience of a seamless, linear continuum 
(which leads us to the two assumptions: that events have duration – ‘befores’, ‘durings’ and 
‘afters’ – and that both the fact that time advances from the past towards the future and the 
rate at which it does so are also objective features of external reality). 
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But, as illustrated by the challenges to our assumptions posed by the implications of quantum 
theory (according to which neither space nor time act in accordance with the familiar Newtonian 
model of reality), we often overlook the extent to which our understanding of – and therefore our 
experience of – both are cognitive constructs which establish the limits of the “bounded arena of 
shared expectations” (Sekula 1982: 84) and so define what it is that we expect photographs to be 
able to show us.  
 
Our experience/conception of space 
Our conception (‘mental map’) and experience of the real world are, in part, the product of the 
structure of the human body, including the functions of our sense-organs and the operation of our 
central nervous system (von Uexküll 1926). Accordingly, we must be wary of the powerful 
influence of the anthropocentric assumptions that “we see things as they really are”* (Hyvärinen 
1994; Holyoak and Thagard 1995; Wolf 2003) and that they ‘really are’ three-dimensional. 
 
With its monocular eye, the camera knows nothing of depth and distance, but renders (what we 
‘know’ to be) a three-dimensional world as a contiguous series of two-dimensional surfaces 
because this Cyclops ‘sees’ it as such. In doing so, the camera depicts – and so makes visible to us 
– relationships and juxtapositions in space (such as that photo of Aunt Edith with the telephone 
pole protruding from the top of her head) that we did not – or could not – see in the original scene. 
As a result, our conviction that three dimensions are an objective, tangible property of external 
reality leads us to think of photographs as two-dimensional ‘shadows’ of what were ‘really’ the 
three-dimensional forms which cast them – and from which essential details have been lost in 
translation. 
 
                                                   
* I am not referring here to the accuracy of our interpretation of the social/cultural meaning or significance of 
objects, but only to our confidence in our ability to discern their ‘true’ form or appearance. 
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[Figure 5] 
 
[Figure 6] 
 
In Figures 5 and 6, we are confronted by amusing mis-representations resulting from the camera’s 
‘magic trick’ which has reduced what were ‘really’ three-dimensional spaces into two-
dimensional ‘shadows’. They are amusing because we can see through the trick to recognise what 
had really been there in front of the lens. 
 
How might our interpretation of such photographs and our capacity to conceive of what (else) 
they may show us expand were we to consider that, rather than two-dimensional ‘shadows’ of the 
real three-dimensional world, such photographs are accurate depictions of a world that, for the 
camera, really is two-dimensional?* What might we then recognise hidden behind (sorry: that is a 
binocular precept; I mean hidden within) the world we know only through binocular vision?  
 
Our experience/conception of time 
Our conception of time as a seamless continuum imposes a conceptual frame of reference: what 
Enkvist (1995: 123) calls the “epistemics of cause and effect”. As a result, the same 
anthropocentric biases found in the priorities of visual research methodologies are also evident in 
our assumptions that photographs show us changes in the world that the photograph suspends 
(Sutton 2009: 38). As a result, we regard the photograph as an ‘excerpt’ from the real, full and 
unabridged event.  
 
                                                   
* A helpful insight into the camera’s two-dimensional view of the world is offered in the 1884 satirical novella 
Flatland by Edwin Abbott Abbott which describes a world that exists in only two dimensions and whose 
inhabitants are thereby unable to even conceive of a third. 
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From the earliest days of photography, it was acknowledged that the medium reveals moments-in-
time (such as The Horse in Motion [1878] by Muybridge and Edgerton’s photograph [1962] of a 
bullet passing through an apple) we could not otherwise witness. But, in the same way that we 
think of shadows as two-dimensional reductions of three-dimensional objects, we think of the 
discrete slices of time extracted from what is ‘really’ a continuum as a kind of ‘chronological 
shadow’ from which essential information (the ‘before’ and ‘after’) have likewise been lost in 
translation.  
 
The central problem was how to take […] moving reality and turn it into a static record for sober and 
steady analysis... (Ramalingam 2010: 3)  
 
Note the assumption that ‘real’ reality moves. 
 
In his discussion of the effect of slow motion and stop action which, the lawyers for the officers of 
the LAPD argued, biased the jury’s perceptions of the “truthfulness” of the (1991) video 
recording of the assault on motorist Rodney King, Arnheim too, implies that our perception of 
time is the real one – agreeing that slow motion minimized the violence of the assault because “in 
the real world…” Arnheim (1993: 537).  
 
For Sutton too, time is understood to be objective, constant and knowable (meaning, presumably, 
that its properties are consistent with, and revealed by, our experience of it) and that its nature is 
revealed in “movement in space” as in “the sweep of the hands on the face of a clock” (2009: 34-
35). Sutton not only endorses the objective, quantifiable nature of time, but conscripts 
photography to support this, claiming that “[p]hotographs can be used to quantify time in the 
same way that a measuring stick [...] can quantify space” (Sutton 2009: 34). 
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[Figure 7] 
 
Consider the way in which we understand and make sense of photographs such as Figure 7. Do 
we not look through the frozen image in an effort to recognise what really happened and which 
has been excerpted in the photograph? When we look at this photograph, do we not see the full, 
unabridged continuous action – as if in a film – of the diver’s body falling towards and then 
entering the water, rather than the static moment the photograph actually shows us? 
 
As an illustration of an alternative way of thinking about time, consider Arnheim’s story of The 
Monk and the Mountain:  
 
One morning, exactly at 8 A.M., a monk began to climb a tall mountain. The narrow path spiralled 
around the mountain to a glittering temple at the summit. The monk ascended the path at varying 
rates of speed, stopping many times along the way to rest and to eat the dried fruit he carried with 
him. He reached the temple precisely at 8 P.M. After several days of fasting and meditation, he 
began his journey back along the same path, starting at 8A.M. and again walking at varying speeds 
with many pauses along the way. He reached the bottom at precisely 8 P.M. (Arnheim 1969). 
 
Is there a place somewhere along the path which the monk occupied at precisely the same time of 
day on both trips? – And how can we know? The only way to solve the problem (to recognise that, 
yes, there is indeed a spot along the path which the monk occupied at precisely the same time of 
day on both trips) is to mentally superimpose the two days and so ‘see’ the monk bump into 
himself. But the way in which we experience time (our unquestioning conviction of the objective 
reality of the Newtonian universe in which times travels in a single direction at a constant rate) 
makes it very difficult for us to see or conceive of time in any other way.  
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[Figure 8] 
 
From the earliest photographs, it has been evident that photographic time is very different than 
ours, and so sometimes shows us the world as we could not otherwise have seen it. Consider 
Daguerre’s 1839 photograph Boulevard du Temple (Figure 8) in which, as a consequence of the 
ten-minute duration of the exposure, none of the people on this busy Parisian street was in one 
place long enough to be recorded – except the figure (bottom left) who paused long enough to 
have his boots polished, thereby becoming the first human to appear in a photograph. The 
resulting photograph presents us with a scene that is otherwise inaccessible to a human observer – 
and so offers us a glimpse of a real world, but one that only the camera could witness and record.  
 
Consider the photographs Pressure 1 by Hamed Jaberha (Figure 9) and Near Callanish, Isle of 
Lewis by David Quentin (Figure 10) in which (like the photographs Derrière la gare St-Lazare, 
Paris 1932 by Cartier-Bresson and Ballet, NYC 1938 by Kertész) elements hang motionless, 
suspended in mid-air.  
 
[Figure 9] 
 
[Figure 10] 
 
Photographs such as these ‘rocks in the air’ present us with a logical conundrum. While their 
photo-mechanical origins argue that they are objective and reliable records of what was (Snyder 
and Allen 1975), our conception of time precludes us from seeing what the photographs clearly 
show us: rocks that are suspended motionless in mid-air. (Note the ease with which we are 
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prepared to set aside our conviction in the truthfulness and reliability of photographic evidence 
when this conflicts with the assumptions imposed by our bino-chrono consciousness about what 
really was. Where now, our confidence in the uniquely objective credibility of photographic 
evidence?) Instead, despite the photographic evidence, we conclude that, like galloping horses 
frozen in midstride, as a consequence of extracting excerpts from the continuum, these 
photographs mis-represent what we know really happened. 
 
In explaining their intentions in making these photographs, Jaberha wrote:  
 
Sometimes I don’t know they are going up or falling [down] but I would like watching [them] fly, 
whereas they are too heavy for flying! [T]he photographs have [been] taken next to the places of the 
war (between Iran and Iraq). These places still have many [of] the war mines from about 30 years 
ago. Although Saddam Hosain is [dead], the evil is still alive. It reminds me there is a tragedy 
behind the beautiful nature. (personal correspondence) 
 
Quentin wrote:  
 
[This series of photographs] is forcibly retrieving time from the vertiginous depths of “geological slow 
time”: it is showing us geological ultra-fast time instead. Documentary geological photography for 
the anthroposcene, maybe? (personal correspondence) 
 
[Figure 11] 
 
In his photograph (Figure 11) Paranal Residencia, Colosimo shows us an equally objective and 
accurate record of a moment, but one which is not accessible to us – and so was not ‘there’ to be 
taken, but was instead created by the act of photographing it.  
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[Figure 12] 
 
In his photographs of dancers Oihana Vesga Bujan and Elly Braund of the Richard Alston Dance 
Company (Figure 12), Guest combines the frozen and the fluid to show us (like Mili’s 
stroboscopic studies) moments-in-time which are both an objective record of what was – and 
which exist only in the records made of them: moments which were created by an act of 
photography.  
 
In describing his intentions for these photographs, Guest wrote:  
 
Photography is designed to freeze moments, to capture and hold in its grasp both the fleeting and the 
ephemeral. However, choreographers and dancers are [interested] instead in the journey between the 
two. This project [uses photography] to describe the progression of movement through time, as well as 
the suspension of time itself. (personal correspondence). 
 
Just as with the medium’s depiction of three-dimensional space, the “bounded arena of shared 
expectations” (Sekula 1982: 84) imposed by the “dominant way of thinking about the medium” 
(Batchen 1999) makes it difficult to accept that alternative experiences and depictions of time may 
be equally “natural and truthful” (Fosdick and Fahmy 2007: 1) and show us scenes and events “as 
they really are” (Ross 1982: 12). Instead, confronted with such frozen or fluid events-in-time, we 
are obliged either to dismiss the photograph as an inaccurate depiction of the event(s) it purports 
to record (but, as a mechanical recording, how can a photograph be inaccurate?) – or 
acknowledge that the moment or event documented in the photograph exists only in the record 
made of it – and was therefore created by the act of photographing it. 
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Rather than seeing such photographs as ‘chronological shadows’ from which the ‘before’ and 
‘after’ essential to a true (anthropocentric) understanding of what ‘really’ happened have been lost 
in translation, what if we were to consider that the conception of time photographs show us is 
equally real and objectively true: a perpetual ‘now’ in which everything is happening at once – 
and keeps on happening forever? If, instead of ‘excerpts’ or ‘misrepresentations’ of what was 
‘really’ in front of the lens, we were prepared to think of such photographs as truthful accounts of 
‘non-linear space’ and ‘non-chronological time’ otherwise inaccessible to us, we may start to see 
photography through a new conceptual metaphor: as a means to escape, explore – or even to 
depict from a vantage point outside the fence – what Sekula termed the “bounded arena of shared 
expectations” (1982: 84). 
 
The ‘subject’ of photographs 
In the same way that thinking of photographs as ‘taken’ directs (and limits) our attention to the 
person, place or thing removed (Look at this…Do you see what I see?), the widely held view that, 
like Waldo, the subject of the photograph is ‘in’ the picture (Phillips 2009), directs (and limits) 
our attention to either the appearance or the behaviour of the thing removed.  
 
Another example of the way in which the popular conception of photographs is bounded by 
shared expectations is the assumption that the subject of the photograph is, by necessity, some 
thing that exists (Phillips 2009), that this thing is the scene or object represented (Scruton 1981) – 
and not the way in which it represents it (Phillips 2009). 
 
Barthes tells us that a photograph cannot be distinguished from its referent, that “a pipe […] is 
always and intractably a pipe” (1984: 5) – but, in La trahison des images, Magritte instructs us 
otherwise: that a painting of a pipe is not a pipe. This conflation of the subject of the photograph – 
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what the photograph is ‘about’ – with the thing/s in front of the lens is the source of the error of 
reification commonly made in describing our photographs (This is our daughter Rhiannon…). 
 
Consider this popular conception of the subject of photographs in the context of Capa’s 
remarkable series of photographs Allied landing on Normandy beaches, 6th June 1944, many of 
which are blurred as a result of camera motion during the exposure. While this blur might be 
deemed a flaw or weakness in the accuracy with which the photographs depict the thing/s in front 
of the lens, this contribution by the medium is the proof (the logos) of the soldiers’ (and Capa’s) 
frantic efforts to get safely ashore while under fire from the German guns. In this way, these 
photographs are indeed an “accurate and objective record” (Genoni 2002: 137) and “a natural and 
truthful” account (Fosdick and Fahmy 2007: 1) – but an accurate and objective and natural and 
truthful account of their photographicness (Rutherford 2014).  
 
While some have acknowledged that it is possible for photographs to have subjects other than the 
photographed objects (Phillips 2009), efforts to extend the definition of what might be considered 
the subject of the photograph beyond the thing/s in front of the lens shift the locus only a small 
way – to either the photographer’s intent, or his/her expertise in the manipulation of the medium – 
and so we return to where we began: that the subject of photographs (those aspects of photographs 
to which we should attend) are the product of (the interaction of) the three factors:  
i. The appearance and/or behaviour of the thing/s in front of the lens 
ii. The photographer’s intention 
iii. The photographer’s expertise 
 
The position, implicit in the logic of the discourse (and reaffirmed by Scruton and others), that the 
subject of the photograph is that which we see through the portal and not the way in which the 
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camera represents it (Phillips 2009) blinkers us to the possibility that, as is the case in these and 
the other remarkable works by Treharne (Figure 13), the subject of the photograph is the way in 
which the medium has recorded it – a feature of the image which is not the result of either 
intention, expertise or the appearance/behaviour of the thing/s in front of the lens. The subject of 
such photographs is instead… photography itself (Solomon-Godeau 1981: 26). 
 
[Figure 13] 
 
Treharne wrote:  
 
I want my photographs to exist as a world of their own, not as window on the world. (personal 
correspondence) 
 
Accordingly, rather than a documentary or social truth, the subject of the photograph – what the 
photo is actually ‘about’ – is (sometimes) the glimpse it offers of the world as it really is – but as it 
really is to the camera: a way of knowing the world around us which is otherwise invisible to us 
due to the conceptual constraints imposed by bino-chrono consciousness. The scenes and 
moments thus recorded did not – and sometimes could not – exist ‘out there’, but, as both the 
record and the product of a very different way of experiencing the world, were only made visible 
by the active contribution of photography (Rutherford 2014). 
 
In the final section, I will briefly consider the work of other photographers which challenges and 
extends the bounds of our shared expectations and which suggests alternative ways of imagining 
what else our photographs might actually be ‘about’.  
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So, are these photographs ‘taken’? 
As a result of their influence our conception of what photographs ‘are’ and what they are able to 
show us, the assumptions imposed by language, the logic of the discourse and our experience of 
space and time hinder our ability to recognise the possibility that:  
· Sometimes, the scenes, events and moments depicted in photographs did not exist out there 
– and so could not have been witnessed and therefore could not have been intended, and 
that 
· The medium of photography is sometimes therefore an active collaborator in the creation of 
scenes, events and moments that exist only as a result of photographing them. 
 
This contribution by the medium has been noted by relatively few photographers:  
 
I never have taken a picture I’ve intended. You don’t put into a photograph what’s going to come out. 
Or what comes out is not what you put in. The camera is ‘recalcitrant’. You may want to do one thing 
and it’s determined to do something else. (Diane Arbus 1972: 11 & 14-15) 
 
I photograph to find out what something will look like photographed. [T]he photograph isn’t what was 
photographed, it’s something else. (Garry Winogrand, cited by Sontag 1973: 197; Diamonstein 1981-
82) 
 
Neumann’s work (Figures 14 and 15) intentionally explores the camera’s unique contribution in 
the creation of unanticipatable results. In his series Landscapes, Neumann explains that he invited 
the camera collaborate with him to produce patterns and textures created by the movement of the 
camera during the exposure.  
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[Figure 14] 
 
[Figure 15] 
 
Neumann wrote:  
 
In [this] series, the resulting images were created in the camera. The resulting image is what the 
camera ‘saw’. The images represented the many possibilities of chance (personal correspondence). 
 
The photographs by Llarena (Figures 16 and 17) and Searight (Figure 18) offer us accurate and 
objective and truthful accounts of both ‘non-linear space’ and ‘non-chronological time’ which can 
only be made visible to us through the act of photographing them. 
 
[Figure 16] 
 
[Figure 17] 
 
In explaining her intentions in making these photographs, Llarena wrote:  
 
Optical Kinetics […] intends to make viewers aware of the constant surveillance surrounding us. The 
inevitable discomfort in watching and being watched brings us a step closer to the intellectual 
movement, Transhumanism. Our sense of autonomy is diminished by close surveillance, promoting a 
distortion of us as self-determined beings. Our perceptions vary from person to person and the belief 
that we are merely passing through life in a world that is constantly changing, the sense of déjà vu 
exists. It is the idea that each of us, not society or religion, race or colour, should give meaning to an 
apparent meaningless world. (personal correspondence) 
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[Figure 18] 
 
In explaining this photograph, Searight wrote:  
 
[I]n the same way that a potter does not know exactly what is going to emerge from his kiln until the 
door is opened, I was never sure that I created a worthwhile result until I saw it on a big screen in 
front of me. [T]his process has taken me quite a long way away from photography as a mechanistic 
process which has often been trivialised by the sophistication of modern cameras. (personal 
correspondence) 
 
In her series At the Museum (Figure 19), Kyne draws on a way of representing the thing/s in front 
of the lens unique to the photomechanical process: that of seeing ‘out of focus’. In explaining her 
objectives, she too, is one of very few photographers who considers that her way of working is to 
collaborate with the camera (what she describes as her “camera-being”) to create scenes and 
moments which, in the manner in which they appear in the resulting photograph, did not exist (or, 
again, were unavailable to us) until brought into being by the act of photographing.  
 
[Figure 19] 
 
In explaining her intentions in making these photographs, Kyne wrote:  
 
[W]e perceive reality through phenomena and since by definition, phenomena [are] described through 
the senses, our imagination of what possibly IS, is limited. It is an unconscious bias that I aim to disrupt. 
My camera and I act as a unique species, perceiving reality as only ‘it’ can. If the viewer can accept the 
perception of my camera-being, we can get on with the activity of imagining what else IS, and also 
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realize that our fixed notions might not be correct. Another thing that is important for me is to show 
photographs as agents, rather than just the pointers of Postmodern theory (personal correspondence). 
 
My practice attempts to explore the ways in which the camera maps the world by offering it 
scenes and materials (such as juxtaposed planes and the reflections in the topography of three-
dimensional surfaces) whose potential is apparent to even a bino like me. Through these projects, 
I use the camera as a way to ‘see through the fence’ and explore ways of seeing that are otherwise 
inaccessible to us through the conceptual limits imposed by our ‘bino-chrono’ way of knowing. 
 
[Figure 20] 
 
In the series Submarines (Figure 20), I sought to create conditions that made it impossible for me 
to see or to choose the scenes and moments recorded by the camera. In the first stage of this series, 
I held the camera directly above and parallel to the surface of the water, while those who had 
agreed to undergo the ordeal of posing for me lay submerged, facing upwards, trying to keep their 
eyes open. As a result, I was unable to look in the viewfinder when releasing the shutter – and, 
even if I had been able to see the viewfinder, the constant changes in the surface of the water and 
the ‘delay’ between pushing the button and the release of the shutter made it impossible to 
‘choose’ with intent the particular scene or ‘moment’ recorded by the camera. 
 
[Figure 21] 
 
In the second stage. Supermarines (Figure 21), a waterproof camera was held below the surface of 
the water and pointed upwards (diagonally) through the surface towards figures whose heads and 
torsos were above the surface. Once again, the constant changes in the surface texture of the water 
Is this photograph taken? 
27 
and the delay in the release of the shutter made it impossible to arrange the elements within the 
frame (or even to predict with any certainty what elements might be in the frame), to anticipate 
how they will be rendered or depicted, and therefore to choose with intent the appearance of the 
particular scene or ‘moment’ to be recorded or the moment at which the photograph was made. 
 
As a consequence of the inability of any human observer to have seen/witnessed/experienced the 
image (the unique configuration of the thing/s in front of the lens as they would appear in the 
resulting photograph) in the microsecond during which it existed – as this would have required 
this observer to i) remain underwater while the photographs were being recorded and ii) be 
capable of seeing the image in the viewfinder while both were underwater – I submit that the 
scenes and ‘moments’ recorded in these photographs did not exist (or were entirely inaccessible to 
any human observer – which, except for hardcore positivists, amounts to the same thing…) in any 
meaningful sense of the term and so were not ‘there’ to be ‘taken’ but, as both the record and the 
product of the camera’s way of seeing, were instead created by the act of photographing them. 
 
[Figure 22] 
 
[Figure 23] 
 
Conclusion 
The dominant way of thinking about the medium and the language through which this is 
reinforced has defined:  
· The assumptions implicit in the logic of the discourse and in the shared expectations of both 
practitioners and critics as to what photographs ‘are’, how they are produced and what they 
are ‘for’ 
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· What many practitioners consider it possible to achieve with the medium 
· The way in which photography is taught to aspiring practitioners 
 
If, instead of looking through photographs for their subject (and one which we expect to be a 
social or human truth), and begin to look at them, we are likely to be obliged to find new words 
and phrases to describe what they show us and these may, in turn, help us to see photographs – 
both the way they are created and what they show us – through a new conceptual metaphor.  
 
By challenging our assumptions about the contribution of the photographic medium in the 
creation of images, and considering instead that photographs can be the result of a collaborative 
relationship with the medium and its unique way of seeing both space and time, it may be possible 
to devise new practices through which we can explore both the world ‘out there’ and the world ‘in 
here’ and uncover phenomena which we can see no other way. 
 
 
7,817 words (excluding Figure captions and References) 
Is this photograph taken? 
29 
Figure captions 
 
Figure 1 – The last known image of the Titanic as she set sail from Queenstown, Ireland for New 
York. Photo by Kate Odell, 11 April, 1912 
Figure 2 – Anne Frank leaning over the balcony of her apartment in Amsterdam. Photo by Otto 
Frank, 22 July, 1941 
Figure 3 – Dog in Soap Bubble – from ebaumsworld.random-randoms84611023 
Figure 4 – Rabbit-in-the-Fire-Optical-Illusion – from moillusions.com 
Figure 5 – Floating boat optical illusion – from https://c1.staticflickr.com 
Figure 6 – Promenade des Anglais #3, Nice 2000 © Rutherford 
Figure 7 – Dotýkej se me (Touch me) – from http://galerie.digiarena.e15.cz/ 
Figure 8 – 1839 Boulevard du Temple par Louis Daguerre 
Figure 9 – Pressure 1 © Hamed Jaberha 
Figure 10 – Near Callanish, Isle of Lewis © David Quentin 
Figure 11 –Paranal Residencia © John Colosimo (colosimophotography.com) ESO 
Figure 12 – Dancers Oihana Vesga Bujan and Elly Braund of the Richard Alston Dance 
Company © Rick Guest 
Figure 13 – Blackhole sunflower and La Rochelle, France © Adrian Treharne  
Figure 14 – Tour Magne, Nimes 1980 © Alex Neumann 
Figure 15 – Trees, spring, Toronto Canada 1980 © Alex Neumann 
Figure 16 – Optical kinetics 3 - Ghosts of Grafton © Cris Llarena 
Figure 17 – Optical kinetics 4 - Hats Serenade © Cris Llarena 
Figure 18 – 16_A0024599 © Peter Searight  
Figure 19 – At the Museum 13, 2010 and At the Museum 31, 2012 © Barbara Kyne 
Figure 20 – Cretan Sea submarine 0488 and submarine David © Rutherford 
Figure 21 – Cretan Sea supermarine 4201 and Hooman Moghadam supermarine 215261 © 
Rutherford 
Figure 22 – Cretan Sea supermarine 6288 © Rutherford 
Figure 23 – Leon Anselmann supermarine 475487 © Rutherford 
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